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Abstract
Philip Kitcher develops the Galilean Strategy to defend realism against
its many opponents. I explore the structure of the Galilean Strategy
and consider it specifically as an instrument against constructive empiri-
cism. Kitcher claims that the Galilean Strategy underwrites an inference
from success to truth. We should resist that conclusion, I argue, but the
Galilean Strategy should lead us by other routes to believe in many things
about which the empiricist would rather remain agnostic.
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5. Conclusion
1 Target: Empiricism
In Real Realism: The Galilean Strategy ([2001a], henceforth RR), Philip Kitcher
offers a defense of realism from nearly half-a-dozen arguments against it. Against
constructivists and empiricists, on matters both semantic and epistemic, he de-
ploys the Galilean Strategy—a move to show that methods of settling ques-
tions about unobjectionable, observable matters should be relied on to settle
questions about controversial, unobservable matters. (He develops the Galilean
Strategy in less detail elsewhere ([2001b], ch. 2).) Here I will centrally concern
myself with the response to van-Fraassen-style constructive empiricism, but my
concerns may be raised with respect to the rest.
Kitcher outlines an argument from empiricist premises to the rejection of
methods that putatively inform us about unobservables: We should only rely
on methods that we can check independently. We can only check matters that
we can observe. So, we should only rely on methods insofar as they inform
us about observables. Therefore, we should remain agnostic about conclusions
regarding unobservables.1
Kitcher notes that this argument has a long pedigree and sees Bas van
Fraassen as its contemporary champion (RR, fn. 27 p. 166). In a recent pa-
per, van Fraassen writes the following:
If you see a reflection of a tree in the water, you can also look at the
tree and gather information about the geometric relations between
the tree, the reflection, and your vantage point. The invariances
in those relations are precisely what warrant the assertion that the
reflection is a picture of the tree. If you say similarly about the
microscopes images that they are pictures of e.g. paramecia, then
you are asserting that there are certain invariant geometric relations
between the object, image, and vantage point. But now you are pos-
tulating that these relations hold, rather than gathering information
about whether that is so. ([2001], p. 160)
This is not yet an anti-realist conclusion. To show that we ought not believe in
paramecia, one would need to show that we ought not postulate paramecia—
something van Fraassen does not try to show. Rather than claiming that pos-
tulating paramecia is irrational, van Fraassen insists that it is not compelled
by rationality. We may believe in paramecia or we may remain agnostic, as we
choose. The former exposes us to the risk of being wrong when we might have
avoided error, and the latter exposes us to the risk of not believing a truth that
we might have believed. As William James observes, our obligations to gather
truth and avoid error are continually in conflict.2 Van Fraassen only insists that,
in light of this potential conflict, avoiding potential error by remaining agnos-
tic about unobservables is permissible. Thus, Kitcher would need to do more
than defeat the argument above in order to sway the constructive empiricist.
He needs to provide a positive argument that empiricists should give up their
agnosticism.
Indeed, Kitcher provides a positive argument. Examining the argumentative
strategies that Galileo employed in convincing his contemporaries to believe
what they could see in telescopes, he argues that they had good reason (as van
Fraassen might put it) to postulate the moons of Jupiter, the rings of Saturn, and
all the rest. Moreover, he claims that an analogue of Galileo’s argument gives
us good reason to accept other methods that inform us about unobservables.
2 The Galilean Strategy
In 1610, Galileo was faced with the problem of justifying the telescope as an
instrument. One could see points of light when looking through the device to-
ward Jupiter, but Galileo needed to show that the lights were moons and not
not artefacts of the telescope itself. He did this ‘by showing that the telescope
would deliver conclusions that could be verified using methods that his con-
temporaries, including his critics, would accept’ (RR, p. 173). He could take
it out on a balcony, point it at a distant building, and anyone could see detail
through it that they could only make out from a lesser distance with their naked
eyes; this readily showed that the telescope was good for discerning details of
structures in Northern Italy. After such tests, Kitcher notes, none of Galileo’s
interlocutors worried that the telescope would not work for such applications
in the vicinity of London or Amsterdam. Within the terrestrial realm, there
was no reason to draw a distinction between these places. As Kitcher writes:
‘Galileo’s central problem was to make the celestial-terrestrial distinction appear
as irrelevant as the difference between London. . . and Venice’ (RR, p. 174).
Kitcher analyzes Galileo’s answer to this problem into two parts. First,
Galileo exploited the vagueness of the boundary between the observable and
the unobservable to show that the telescope was reliable beyond the bounds of
what was straight-forwardly observable. Where only sharp-eyed observers could
distinguish a fine detail unaided, both they and folks of ordinary acuity could
make it out with the telescope. The deliverances of the telescope were thus
shown to be continuous with the deliverances of plain vision—the unobservable
was shown to be continuous with the observable. Importantly, this could be done
for astronomical phenomena. Already, the boundary between the terrestrial
and the celestial was softening. Second, Galileo argued directly against that
boundary by cataloguing changes in the allegedly immutable heavens. Kitcher
summarizes the action: ‘Combining these two arguments with his ability to
distribute telescopes that would generate an increasingly more consistent set of
astronomical observations, Galileo was able to convince his peers that there was
no more basis for thinking that the instrument was unreliable in the heavens
than for believing it inept in some as yet untried part of the earth’ (RR, p. 174).
Kitcher, not centrally concerned with the telescope, derives from Galileo’s
argument an argumentative schema that he dubs the Galilean Strategy. He
generalizes in this way:
Methods of justification, like Galileo’s telescope, can only be vali-
dated by examining the conclusions about observables to which they
lead. It does not follow that the only conclusions licensed by those
methods are conclusions about observables—any more than Galileo’s
demonstrations on buildings and ships only show that the telescope
is reliable in Venice. We need to consider whether there are good
reasons for distinguishing a method’s usage in its application to ob-
servables from its usage in application to unobservables. (RR, p.
175)
To distinguish it from the particular arguments made by Galileo, let’s call the
Galilean Strategy ‘GS’. Take some methodM that provides the correct answers
for matters we can check independently. GS may be summarized by the following
schema:
GS1 M provides correct answers up to and along the vague boundary between
matters we can check independently of M and ones that we cannot check.
GS2 Prevailing reasons for thinking that the boundary might make a difference
to the reliability of M are mistaken.
. .˙ M provides the correct answers for matters that we cannot check indepen-
dently of M .
3 Strengthening the argument
There is an obvious way to employ GS against the constructive empiricist. To
begin, Galileo’s own arguments will do. Telescopes provide us a way of learning
about the moons of Jupiter, the rings of Saturn, and many things more distant
and exotic.3 A trivial variant of Galileo’s argument might motivate belief in en-
tities visible through optical microscopes: paramecia, cells, cellular organelles,
and so on. We can use magnifying glasses and microscopes to clearly see things
that we could otherwise see only with careful scrutiny, we can use them to see
features which only our sharp-eyed friends can make out, and so on. The em-
piricist may resist these cases—distant things seen through the telescope could
be made observable to everyone merely by bringing them closer, but this is not
possible with the microscope. The empiricist may look to Hacking, who notes
that the move ‘from a magnifying glass to even a low powered microscope is the
passage from what we might be able to observe with the eye unaided, to what
we could not observe except with instruments’ ([1985], p. 135). Nevertheless,
there are intermediate cases for which we can confirm the things seen with the
microscope. Hacking provides the example of microscopic metal grids used for
reidentifying particular bodies on microscope slides. Grids of ordinary size are
photographically reduced and metalized using techniques which operate also in
the macroscopic realm ([1985], pp. 146–7). We can imagine making a series of
grids, the largest clearly observable to the average person without any mag-
nification and the smallest unobservable to even the keenest eyes. This series
of cases would show that the microscope is reliable at and through the limits
of what the average person can observe using only their unaided vision. (GS1
is satisfied for the optical microscope.) There is no reason to believe that the
operation of the microscope changes when we point it at things just beyond the
acuity of our sharp-eyed friends. (GS2 is satisfied.) Thus, we draw the Galilean
inference: Things we see in the microscope are really there.
Van Fraassen urges agnosticism about the deliverance of microscopes, but
concedes, ‘. . .I really don’t mind very much if you reject this option for the
optical microscope. I will be happy if you agree to it for the electron microscope.
. . . The point of constructive empiricism is not lost if the line is drawn in a
somewhat different way from the way I draw it. The point would be lost only
if no such line drawing is considered relevant to our understanding of science’
([2001], pp. 162–3). So a constructive empiricist can agree, in light of GS, that
there are paramecia and distant moons. Yet the genie of postulation, once let
out of the bottle, is not so easily put back in.
Once we believe in the features that we can see with an optical microscope,
we can employ GS again. The gross features that can be discerned with an
electron microscope can be discerned with an optical microscope, and we can
check them against each other up to the limits of optical magnification; see
Hacking ([1985], p. 144). (GS1 is satisfied for the electron microscope.) There
is no good reason to think that the electron microscope betrays us just beyond
the limits of what we can check. (GS2 is satisfied.) So we should believe in things
we can see with electron microscopes. Similar strategies can be used to extend
the boundary of the observable whenever a new instrument has overlapping
applications with one already vindicated by GS.4
The constructive empiricist may reply that the boundary between the ob-
servable and the unobservable, vague though it may be, is principled. Take van
Fraassen’s preferred principle that observables are those entities and properties
that are amenable to direct, unaided perception ([1980], p. 10). Paramecia are
unobservable, but an application of GS directs us to believe in paramecia; so the
constructive empiricist needs some way to deflect GS. Note that the premise
GS2 only asserts that prevailing arguments are insufficient to show that cases
we cannot check would be different from cases that we can check. Why should
the burden of proof lie that way? The constructive empiricist may insist that
GS2 is insufficient and that there must be some positive reason to suppose that
cases we cannot check would be like cases that we can check. If we accept
this demand—and I can see no compelling reason not to—GS requires an extra
premise:
GS3 There is some significant positive reason to think that the success ofM on
matters we can check generalizes to matters that we cannot check.
Whereas GS2 obtains when we have no reason to think M will fail beyond
the limit of the observable, GS3 obtains only when we have some reason to think
M will succeed.5 To apply GS3, we need to show that there is continuity among
the various applications of the method M . We might do this by marshalling
systematic, theoretical resources. When M is an instrument, though, we may
begin with the homey observation that it is the same instrument used in the
same way in both cases. A microscope is the same observable, material object
when used to view the date on a penny and when used to look at a paramecium.
Even when different lenses are used, the lenses may be made from the same glass
and ground in the same way. The very material of the instrument provides
continuity between cases in which it is used to look at observables and cases in
which it is used to look at unobservables.
As Kitcher notes, Galileo’s defense of the telescope involved relevant formu-
lations of GS1 and GS2, but also an effort ‘to distribute telescopes that would
generate an increasingly more consistent set of astronomical observations’ (RR,
p. 174, cited above). Demonstrating the consistency of the instrument was a
way of showing that telescopic observations of observables and unobservables
were due to similar causes and thus that GS3 was satisfied. Whereas Kitcher
offers this as a move in addition to GS, it is plausibly seen as supporting a
further premise of GS. The fact that it was part of Galileo’s strategy gives some
reason to try and see it as part of the Galilean Strategy.
4 Success and truth
Kitcher does not apply GS in the way I suggested in the previous section.
Rather, he considers the realist inference from the success of a theory to the
truth of that theory. A querist may entertain theories about matters which
are temporarily unobservable to her; some theories will prove successful, others
will not. Later, she can check for herself or confer with others to learn which
theories were true and which false. She will find—Kitcher suggests—a strong,
positive correlation between success and truth. Just as Galileo’s interlocutors
could view distant buildings through the telescope and later check the results,
the querist notes which theories are successful and later checks to see that those
are true. Taking inference from success to truth as M , GS1 is satisfied. It takes
this form:
GS1k Inferring truth from success provides correct answers up to and along the
vague boundary between the observable and the unobservable.
Of course, ‘success’ must be understood in a rather strict way. If the querist’s
only goal is to give up smoking, then the correlation with truth will not be ro-
bust. ‘Smoking is bad for me’ might facilitate success, but so would ‘Evil aliens
will smite me if I light up again.’ Kitcher constrains the type of success under
consideration in several ways. First, he considers only success at prediction
and at guiding intervention. Second, success must be over a large domain of
applications that require fine-grained identification. Third, success must be at
error-intolerant tasks. Finally, success should not be secured by compensatory
errors. (RR, p. 179) Each restriction bars a way that the success-to-truth in-
ference can fail. Consider a situation in which most any strategy would lead to
a successful outcome, in which actual effort would be required in order to fail.
In such situations, false theories might still support successful prediction and
intervention. These cases are excluded by insisting that the task must be error-
intolerant. The other conditions similarly exclude potential counter-examples
to the correlation between success and truth. Supposing that all the major
counter-examples have been excluded, GS2 is satisfied for the inference from
success understood in this way to truth.6 We might rewrite it perspicuously in
this way:
GS2k Whatever reasons we may have reasons for thinking the inference from
success to truth would fail when applied to unobservables do not apply to
the ‘success’ considered in GS1k.
Kitcher concludes from the instantiation of GS that we can infer the truth or
approximate truth of scientific theories from their success.
Kitcher’s application of GS has affinities with familiar realist arguments that
reach this same conclusion. Realists claim that the best explanation of the suc-
cess of science is the approximate truth of scientific theories. Yet anti-realists
reject inference to the best explanation. Realists reply that such abductive ex-
planation is critical to science, even the bits of science that concern observables.
Thus, one might argue that GS1 is satisfied for inference to the best explana-
tion. Yet, the anti-realist replies, abductive inference in science is to the best
causal explanation. Truth is not the cause of a theory’s success. Peter Lipton
explains: ‘. . .while scientific explanations are typically causal, the truth expla-
nation is not. It is “logical”: the truth of the theory entails the truth of its
observed logical consequences, but it does not cause it’ ([1994], p. 93). This
gives us good reason to think that the inference to the best explanation that we
can check is different from the inference to the best explanation that we cannot
check, so GS2 is not satisfied. As such, GS will not underwrite inference to the
best explanation.
Some realists claim that if the theories of science were not at least approx-
imately true, then the success of science would be a miracle. Even if GS could
be employed to support inferences from ‘P would be a miracle’ to ‘not-P’, the
realist would have no comfort. Empiricists like van Fraassen insist that false
theories could be successful even absent divine intervention.
Yet Kitcher does not employ GS to defend inference to the best explanation
or the no-miracles argument. Rather, he defends the inference from success to
truth directly. Unlike degenerate debates about abductive warrant, his argu-
ment does not rely on an intermediate principle of inference that empiricists
already deny. The empiricist might deny the legitimacy of GS, but it both has a
straight-forward plausibility and is informed by venerable scientific practice. An
obvious objection to GS can be answered by strengthening its assumptions—
adding GS3. It takes this form:
GS3k There is some significant positive reason to think that the reliability
of success-to-truth inferences about observables generalizes to inferences
about unobservables.
Supposing this three-premise version of GS, the anti-realist can only eschew
the success-to-truth rule by showing that one or more of the premises is not
satisfied. It may be obvious that the empiricist’s best target is GS3. When
telescopes and microscopes are pointed at observables or unobservables, they
are the same material instrument; as I argued above, this provides prima facie
reason to think GS3 is satisfied. Yet in the case of successful theories, the
theories are not instruments made of the same stuff as one another. They are
not made of anything at all. Thus, the presumption of continuity of cases for
the microscope cannot be extended to the success-to-truth inference.7 Why
should we suppose that successful theories, even in a narrowly-defined sense,
form a unified class of phenomena? Without some positive argument that what
holds of successful theories of one sort will hold of other successful theories, the
empiricist may reasonably refuse to generalize and thus reject the application
of GS.
The realist may resist the burden of proof represented by GS3. Just as the
difference between the Earth and sky was as irrelevant to the operation of the
telescope as the difference between Venice and London—Kitcher suggests—the
difference between the observable and unobservable is irrelevant until proven
relevant. Kitcher hopes to claim the high ground and set the presumption in
favor of realism, but this begs the question against the empiricist. The Venice-
London rhetoric does not show that GS3 is the wrong standard, since of course
the difference between Italy and England was considered irrelevant to optics
for positive reasons and not merely because no one could say why it should be
relevant.8 Do we have comparable reasons to think that the success-veracity
correlation will generalize? Kitcher says in summary:
In a nutshell, realists think that everyday experience supports a cor-
relation between success and truth. They deny that empiricists can
simply stipulate the limits of reliability of this correlation. Rather,
those limits are to be charted in light of our best overall views about
the ways in which the world works. (RR, p. 178)
Yet if GS3 is required for the application of GS, the empiricist need not stip-
ulate anything; reliability must be argued for rather than presumed, and it is
the realist who must provide positive reasons for thinking the correlation will
remain reliable. Kitcher has realist intuitions, but van Fraassen has empiricist
intuitions. More will be needed than that. It will not do for the realist to say
that whether the boundary of the observable is relevant or not is ‘to be charted
in light of overall views’ about the world, because the empiricist and realist will
cleave to different views.
5 Conclusion
Kitcher’s reconstruction of the Galilean Strategy is informative. Careful appli-
cation of GS may resolve outstanding questions in the philosophy of science; it
is effective against the empiricist and perhaps against other anti-realists that
come under Kitcher’s sights. Nevertheless, it seems insufficient to support the
realists’ beloved connection between success and truth.
Acknowledgements
I first encountered the Galilean Strategy in seminars given by Philip Kitcher at
the University of California, San Diego in 1997 and 1999. The present paper
was prompted by discussion in the scientific realism reading group at UCSD in
Winter 2002 and improved in light of comments from Craig Callender and Jay
Odenbaugh.
P.D. Magnus
Department of Philosophy
Bowdoin College
8400 College Station
Pols House, 5 Bath Road
Brunswick ME 04011-8484
pmagnus@fecundity.com
Notes
1Kitcher calls this argument EEA (RR, pp. 161–2). He provides the argument
in six steps, but nothing here turns on my truncating it as I have done.
2James ([1948], §VII). Longino similarly contrasts the ‘knowledge-extending
mission’ of science with ‘its critical mission’ ([1990], p. 34).
3Van Fraassen allows that the moons of Jupiter are observable, since an
astronaut in the vicinity of Jupiter would be able to see them without a telescope
([1980], p. 16). This is problematic, as Kitcher notes ([1993], p. 152–3). Should
Galileo’s contemporaries have objected by noting the then speculative nature of
space travel?
4As Hacking notes, light microscopes and electron microscopes are both con-
geries of related instruments. Using GS to vindicate the all of them would
require a great deal more than I can say here, but would proceed in a similar
way by exploiting overlaps between the domains of a contested instrument and
vindicated instruments.
5The problem of induction might be invoked as a reason to deny GS3 for
any M , but both the realist and the constructive empiricist should resist such a
move. The constructive empiricist must show that GS3 fails to obtain especially
at the boundary between the observable and the unobservable, but the problem
of induction plagues the unobserved as much as the unobservable.
6If there are further counter-examples, further monster-barring can ensure
that GS2 is satisfied for some version of the realist inference.
7Insofar as theories are linguistic and instruments are causal devices, this
parallels the objection that abductive inference to truth is not the same as
abductive inference to causal explanation.
8Galileo and his contemporaries believed that the laws of physics would be
invariant across space. More simply, travelling around doesn’t seem to effect
the behavior of light.
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